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We examine the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholder in publicly traded companies in nine East Asian countries.  Higher cash-flow rights 
are associated with higher market valuation.  In contrast, higher control rights have an 
insignificant or negative effect on corporate valuation. Deviations of voting from cash-flow 
rights through the use of pyramiding, cross-holdings, and dual-class shares, are associated with 
lower market values.  Results are robust to the time period we study, splitting the sample by 
individual countries, using alternative measures of the incentive for expropriation, and using 
alternative measures for firm valuation.  We conclude that the risk of expropriation is the major 
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Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia 
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan, and Larry Lang 
 
I. Introduction 
The benefits of large investors in enhancing the value of the firm have been the subject of 
extensive research. Block-holders can alleviate one of the main principal-agent problems in the 
modern corporation, i.e., the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. Large 
investors have the power and means to monitor managers and ensure that they act in the best 
interest of shareholders. This monitoring is shown to result in higher corporate valuation.
2  There 
has been less investigation on the costs associated with the presence of large investors and, in 
particular, on their ability to expropriate other stakeholders. Expropriation is defined as the 
process of using one’s control powers to maximize own welfare and redistribute wealth from 
minority shareholders. Theory suggests, however, that incentives for expropriation exist and are 
especially strong when control rights exceed ownership rights. 
In this paper, we fill a gap in the existing literature by providing evidence to suggest that 
controlling shareholders in some East Asian countries expropriate minority shareholders.  Using 
a large database of publicly-traded corporations in nine countries, we find a positive relationship 
between expropriation and the separation of cash-flow from voting rights.  We conclude that the 
primary agency issue for large corporations in East Asia is limiting expropriation of minority 
                                                 
2  For a survey of the literature on the benefits of large shareholders, see section IV in Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997). In the most extreme cases, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that large investors oust 
management through proxy fights or takeovers if the latter pursue empire-building strategies at the 
expense of equity holders.  3 
shareholders by controlling shareholders, rather than restricting empire building by 
unaccountable managers.  
  In previous work (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000), we have documented a large 
divergence between cash-flow and voting rights for corporations across nine East Asian countries. 
Control in these countries is often enhanced through the use of pyramid structures and cross-
holdings among firms.  The analysis here suggests that for these corporations high cash-flow 
rights in the hands of block-holders raise market valuation, consistent with the Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) model.  We also find, however, an insignificant or negative effect of high 
concentration of control on firm value.  This is weakly supportive of the argument that once 
“large owners gain nearly full control of the company, they prefer to generate private benefits of 
control that are not shared by minority shareholders” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.759).   
Separation of cash-flow from voting rights is especially associated with lower market values, 
consistent with Grossman and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988), Bebchuk et al. (1999) and 
Bebchuk (1999).  We interpret the value discount as evidence of expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders. Conversely, Morck et al. (1988) show that when 
managers are also controlling shareholders, i.e., even when the possibility of entrenchment is 
higher, firms trade at a premium within a certain range. This finding suggests that when 
ownership and control go together, these is less incentive for non-value-maximizing behavior, 
although the opportunity of engaging in such behavior increases. 
  The paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes the existing literature on the 
costs of large shareholders.  Section III describes the data sample and the construction of the 
ownership and control variables.  Section IV shows the construction of the valuation measure and 
investigates the evidence on small shareholder expropriation in East Asia.  It also analyzes the  4 
effect of different types of ownership on expropriation. Section V provides a robustness analysis 
by reporting the regression results for each country and using a different method for measuring 
relative firm value.  Section VI concludes.   
 
II.    The Cost of Large Investors 
The research on the topic of ownership structures and corporate valuation dates back to 
Berle and Means (1932) and has found renewed interest following the contributions by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Morck et al. (1988), and Bebchuk et al. (1999).  Berle and Means show 
that diffuse control rights yield significant power in the hands of managers whose interests do not 
coincide with the interest of shareholders.  As a result, corporate resources are not used for the 
maximization of shareholders’ value. Jensen and Meckling conclude that concentrated ownership 
is beneficial for corporate valuation, because large shareholders are better at monitoring 
managers (and because it reduces transaction costs in negotiating and enforcing corporate 
contracts with various stakeholders).  Morck et al. suggest that the absence of separation between 
ownership and control reduces conflicts-of-interest and thus increases shareholder value. 
Bebchuk et al. argue that arrangements that separate control from cash-flow rights create agency 
costs that are an order of magnitude larger that the costs associated with a controlling shareholder 
who has a majority of the cash-flow rights in his company. 
Several other theoretical studies have investigated the effects of separation of cash-flow 
and voting rights on firm value. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998) analyze the separation of 
cash-flow and voting rights; they argue that the under-concentration of cash-flow rights increases 
moral hazard and leads to inefficiencies.  The model suggests expropriation of minority 
shareholders, as the controlling party allocates some corporate resources to the production of  5 
private benefits. Wolfenzon (1999) develops a model where the entrepreneur can decide between 
a horizontal (an independent concern) or a pyramidal structure (as a subsidiary of a company he 
already controls) for his newly-established firm.  The model predicts a higher incidence of 
pyramidal structures in countries with poor investor protection, as such structures can be used by 
the entrepreneur to expropriate other shareholders. Finally, Bebchuk (1999) develops a model to 
show that when the private benefits of control are large, as is the case in industries or countries 
with protected markets, maintaining  a lock on control through separation of ownership and 
control would enable the initial shareholders to retain a larger share of the rents. 
Empirical studies on data for the United States (e.g., Lease et al., 1984; DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Barclay and 
Holderness, 1989; McConnell and Servaes, 1990) find a positive relation between ownership 
concentration (in certain ranges) and corporate valuation.
3 There is recent empirical evidence that 
concentrated ownership can also harm market valuation.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Morck et al. 
(1998), and La Porta et al. (1999b) study the conflicts of interest between large and small 
shareholders.  When large shareholders effectively control a corporation, their policies may result 
in the expropriation of minority shareholders.  The conflicts of interest between large and small 
shareholders can include outright expropriation, i.e., controlling shareholders enriching 
themselves by not paying out dividends, or transferring profits to other companies they control; 
                                                 
3 Other studies (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) argue that the relation is spurious. While 
greater ownership concentration results in stronger incentives to monitor, investors may be inhibited 
from taking value-maximizing positions in firms if the costs associated with amassing large stakes are 
high.  If transaction costs are low, each firm would have the optimal, but not necessarily concentrated, 
ownership structure.    6 
or  de facto expropriation through the pursuit of nonprofit-maximizing objectives by large 
investors.  Such companies are unattractive to small shareholders and their shares are valued less 
relative to their market peers. Morck et al. (1998) show that concentrated corporate control 
impedes growth, as entrenched controlling shareholders have a vested interest in preserving the 
value of existing capital. In the case of Canadian publicly traded companies, openness of capital 
markets mitigates the ill effects of concentrated control. 
The empirical literature on the separation of ownership and control has recently emerged.  
The seminal study on the means used to enhance corporate control is La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1999a), who investigate the separation of ownership and control in over 600 
corporations in 27 rich countries. They find that pyramid structures are the most effective means 
used to enhance control, and that dual-class shares are rarely used, even in countries where their 
usage has been allowed for a long time.  Two case-studies on Italy (Aganin and Volpin, 1998; 
Enriques, 1998) use a similar methodology to document various means used to separate 
ownership and control.
4  Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) extend the analysis of ownership 
and control patterns to East Asia.  They find large family control in more than half of East Asian 
corporations.  Corporations in Japan are generally widely-held, while corporations in Indonesia 
and Thailand are mainly family-controlled. Separation of management from ownership control is 
rare, with management of two-third of firms family-related to the controlling owner. The last 
                                                 
4 Enriques (1999) is part of an on-going project funded by the European Corporate Governance network. 
Working papers on other European countries include Gugler, Stomper, and Zechner (1999) on the 
separation of ownership and control in listed Austrian companies; Becht and Chapelle (1999) on listed 
Belgian companies; Bloch and Kremp (1999) on listed French companies; and De Jong, Kabir, Marra, 
and Roell (1999) on public companies in the Netherlands.  7 
finding suggests that the main principal-agent problem is East Asia is not the conflict of interest 
between owners and managers, as those frequently coincide even in the largest publicly-traded 
corporations. 
The expropriation-of-minority-shareholders hypothesis has not been investigated directly 
until recently. La Porta et al. (1999b) provide support for the quantitative importance of the 
expropriation of minority shareholders in many countries, as well as the role of the law in 
limiting such expropriation. They document higher valuation of firms in countries with better 
protection of minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of benefits of higher cash-flow 
ownership by controlling shareholders on corporate valuation. Several previous papers focus on 
the costs of large block-holdings, interpreting the premium that shares with superior voting rights 
attract as evidence of private benefits of control.
5  Such premia vary between 3% and 5.2% for 
the United States, and are about 81% for Italy.  This set of papers either assumes or finds strong 
congruence of interests between large and small shareholders and argues that the voting premia 
reflect the expectation that voting rights become important in takeover battles. Shleifer and 
Summers (1988) point more specifically to the expropriation of extramarginal benefits to insiders, 
including incumbent managers, if a hostile takeover succeeds. Morck et al. (1988) further suggest 
that takeovers limit the extent of non-value-maximizing behavior on the part of insiders. 
  
III.  Measuring Ownership and Control Rights  
                                                 
5  Studies include Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990) for Sweden, Barclay and Holderness (1989) and 
Zingales (1995) for the United States, Zingales (1994) for Italy, Megginson (1990) for the United 
Kingdom, Robinson and White (1990) for Canada, Horner (1988) for Switzerland, and Levy (1982) for 
Israel.   8 
The analysis is based on newly-assembled data for publicly-traded corporations, including 
both financial institutions and non-financial institutions, in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  As the starting point for our data 
collection, we use the Worldscope database which provides the names and holdings of  the 
largest owners for most firm – 79% of our sample.  
We supplement the Worldscope data with ownership information from the Asian 
Company Handbook 1999, the Japan Company Handbook 1999, Hong Kong Company 
Handbook 1997, the Handbook of Indonesian Companies 1996, the Philippine Stock Exchange 
Investments Guide 1997, the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook 1997, and 
the Singapore Investment Guide to complete the ownership profiles of the remaining 21% of the 
sample (Table A1).  We exclude companies which have proxy ownership that cannot be traced to 
a specific owner.  In all cases, we collect the ownership structure as of December 1996 or the end 
of the 1996 fiscal year.  Information on dual-class shares is provided in Datastream, as described 
in Nenova (1999). Since Datastream carries data only on publicly traded shares, one may worry 
that high-powered voting shares are privately held and thus not in our sample. Unfortunately, this 
is a concern that cannot be addressed with the available data. Another problem is the likely 
presence of convertible non-voting shares and convertible debt. A majority shareholder may have 
little voting stock, but still be able to direct corporate decisions by virtue of being able to freely 
convert non-voting securities into an overwhelming block of voting stock. The available data do 
not allow us to include convertible debt and securities in our calculation of control rights. This is 
likely to bias our results against finding significant evidence of control discounts, as suggested by 
the theory. We supplement these data with country-specific sources for Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand, where Datastream covers a smaller fraction of listed companies.   9 
We also use various country sources on business group affiliation to study the pyramid 
structures and cross-holdings among group-affiliated firms (Table A1).  For the purposes of this 
paper, we define groups as composed of all firms in which a given controlling shareholder has an 
equity stake.  This definition makes it easier to break ties in ownership shares when firms have 
multiple controlling shareholders.  We end up with 2,980 companies for which we can trace the 
ultimate owners. 
In all nine East Asian countries, members of a business group are required to report 
separate accounting data.  If inter-group ownership concentration is high, the group also has to 
supply a consolidated account statement.  For example, a Korean chaebol which has more than 
30% inter-group holdings is required to report a consolidated statement.  At the company level, 
we use consolidated account data when it is disclosed.  Information is provided by Worldscope 
whether all subsidiaries are consolidated, whether consolidation covers only the most significant 
subsidiaries, or whether the report is on a cost basis (unconsolidated).  If a company changes its 
consolidation practice, this change is also recorded in the data.  We include all companies, both 
with consolidated and unconsolidated reports, in the regression analysis.  This is not a significant 
problem here since we have the sales data for each company and consolidate up to the level of 
the firm, as shown in Section IV. When we include only companies that report consolidated data, 
as defined in Worldscope, we get qualitatively similar results. 
We analyze the ownership pattern of companies by studying ultimate shareholdings.  In 
the majority of cases, the principal shareholders are themselves corporate entities, not-for-profit 
foundations, or financial institutions.  We then identify their owners, the owners of their owners, 
etc.  We do not distinguish among individual family members and use the family group as a unit 
of analysis.  We divide corporations into widely-held and corporations with ultimate owners.  A  10 
widely-held corporation is defined as a corporation which does not have any owner who has 10% 
or more of control rights.  In an alternative specification, we use a 20% cut-off for control rights 
in the hands of the largest block-holder.  Ultimate owners are further separated into four 
categories: families including individuals who have large stakes, widely-held financial 
institutions such as banks and insurance companies, widely-held corporations, and the state. 
  Our study of expropriation uses data on both cash-flow and voting rights.  Suppose, for 
example, that a family owns 11% of the stock of publicly-traded Firm A, which in turn has 21% 
of the stock of Firm B.  We then say that the family controls 11% of Firm B the weakest link in 
the chain of voting rights.  In contrast, we say that the family owns about 2% of the cash flow 
rights of Firm B, the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain.  We make the 
distinction between cash-flow and voting rights by documenting for each firm pyramiding 
structures, cross-holdings among firms, and deviations from one-share-one-vote rules. 
To better understand the variety of ownership structures that determine the ultimate control 
of companies, we provide an example.  The example shows some of the complications in the 
construction of ultimate ownership and the wealth of data necessary to ensure proper tracing of 
the ultimate owners in East Asian corporations.  For the remainder of the paper, we use only the 
listed companies in the definition of a business group.  Many companies affiliated with business 
groups in East Asia are unlisted and are not covered in this paper.  For example, at the end of 
1996 the largest three business groups in Korea—Hyundai, Samsung, and LuckyGoldstar—had 
46, 55, and 48 affiliated firms respectively.  Of those, only 16, 14, and 11 were publicly-listed 
companies, respectively.  Since data on unlisted affiliates are unavailable, we cannot extend our 
analysis to unlisted firms. This limits the extent of our study, as it does not allow us to 
experiment with variables like the size of business groups or the number of layers in the group  11 
pyramid. Presumably, more complexity and more group affiliates would increase the opportunity 
for expropriation. 
Figure 1 shows the main holdings of Yasuda Life Insurance, the principal shareholder in 
the Fuyo group, which is the fourth largest keiretsu in Japan. Yasuda Life is a widely-held 
financial institution, since its largest shareholder controls only 1.1% of the voting rights.
6 Two of 
its holdings, Marubeni Corporation and Showa Denko, have dual-class shares owned by Yasuda 
Life Insurance.  In the case of Marubeni Corp., a third of Yasuda Life’s shares have two votes 
each.  These are in fact the only superior-voting shares of Marubeni, enhancing the control rights 
of Yasuda Life to 6.5% of all votes.
7  A similar pattern is observed in the ownership structure of 
Showa Denko – Yasuda Life has about a fifth of its shares with superior voting rights, and these 
are the only shares that deviate from the one-share-one-vote rule.  Studying the ownership and 
control stakes in Figure 1, it does not seem that Yasuda Life has control over 10% of any 
company in the Fuyo group.  This inference turns out to be incorrect, as we will show next. 
Figure 2 provides the ownership and control stakes of Fuji Bank, the third largest member 
of the Fuyo group in terms of market capitalization.  Fuji Bank holds stakes in seven of the 
companies under the direct ownership of Yasuda Life, an example of cross-holdings among 
affiliates of the Fuyo group.  Among the holdings of Fuji Bank, we document both pyramidal 
structures (denoted with solid lines) and cross-holdings (denoted with dotted lines).  Fuji Bank 
                                                 
6  When the parent company is collectively controlled by the aggregate of its “subsidiaries”, each having 
a small equity stake, we call it widely-held. This is almost always the case with firms at the apex of 
Japanese keiretsu. 
7  Note that one can also observe cash-flow rights in excess of voting rights, if some of the other 
shareholders own superior–class shares, or if the shareholder has non-voting shares.  12 
has C&V 4.7% in Marubeni Corp., which in turn has C&V 32.4% in Toyo Sugar. Similarly, Fuji 
Bank has C&V 5% in Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance (Yasuda F&M), which in turn holds 
C&V 12.6% in Tatamono Inc.  Fuji Bank also holds C&V 16.8% in Yasuda Trust, which in turn 
has C&V 6.3% in Toa Corporation. Fuji Bank also holds C&V 5.2% in Toa Corporation directly, 
which is an example of a cross-holding. 
The analysis in Figures 1-2 suggests that there exists a complex network of cross-holdings 
among the members of the Fuyo group, which serve to enhance the ownership and control 
concentration in the hands of Yasuda Life Insurance.  We document the holdings of each of the 
companies in the group and construct a cross-holding matrix for the nine major companies (Table 
1).  This table allows us to find the ultimate ownership and control structure of each major 
company in the Fuyo group.  In effect, the table is similar to an input-output matrix where the 
owners are listed in the rows, and the owned firms are listed in the columns. A larger matrix (not 
reported here) includes cross-holdings among all 42 Fuyo listed affiliates present in our sample.  
The rows in the table indicate the ownership and control stakes in the company listed in 
each column.  For example, Yasuda Life holds C&V 4.4% in Fuji Bank, C&V 7.5% in Oki 
Electric, C&V 8.6% in Yasuda Trust, etc.  (these numbers match the numbers reported in Figure 
1).  Similarly, Yasuda Trust holds C&V 2.8% in Fuji Bank, C&V 4.9% in Oki Electric, etc., i.e., 
the numbers reported in Figure 2.  We use the information in Table 1 to calculate Yasuda Life’s 
ultimate cash-flow and voting rights in Fuji Bank.  Yasuda Life has a direct C&V stake of 4.4%, 
and indirect stakes through Oki Electric, Yasuda Trust, Marubeni Corp., Yasuda Fire and Marine, 
Nippon Seiko, Nihon Cement, and Showa Denko. The indirect stake in Oki Electric enhances 
Yasuda Life’s cash-flow rights in Fuji Bank by 0.5625 percentage points (the product of 7.5 and 
7.5) and voting rights by 7.5 percentage points (which is the minimum of the two 7.5 stakes).   13 
The indirect stake in Yasuda Trust enhances Yasuda Life’s cash flow rights in Fuji Bank by 
0.2408 percentage points (the product of 8.6 and 2.8) and voting rights by 2.8 percentage points 
(the weakest link in the chain of voting rights).  Once we sum up all the direct and indirect stakes 
in Fuji Bank, we reach the conclusion that Yasuda Life owns 5.4469% of Fuji Bank and controls 
19.9% of the voting rights. Using this cross-holding structure, Yasuda Life has almost 
quadrupled its control over Fuji Bank! 
The examples in Figures 1-2 show that ultimate ownership and control are described both 
by their level, and by the type of controlling shareholder.  From a corporate governance 
standpoint, the relevant indicator is the share of ultimate voting rights, as it enables owners to 
determine dividend policies, investment projects, personnel appointments, etc. We start by 
reporting the aggregate statistics on the distribution of ultimate control among the five ownership 
groups identified in the previous section (Table 2).  We study ultimate control at two cut-off 
levels, 10% and 20% of voting rights.  This allows us to describe the differences in the 
concentration of control in the individual firms across the nine East Asian countries.  
There are large differences across countries in the distribution of ultimate control at the 
10% (benchmark) level.  Japan, for example, has also only 13.1% of companies in family hands 
as compared to over half of companies in most other countries (the Philippines has slightly over 
40%).  Japan has only 58% of companies which are controlled by a large shareholder, while the 
remaining eight countries typically have almost all corporations under the control of a large 
investor.  Indonesia, for example, has more than two-thirds (68.6%) of its publicly-listed 
companies in family hands, and only 0.6% are widely-held.  Almost a quarter (23.6%) of the 
publicly-traded companies in Singapore are state-controlled.  14 
  At the 20% cut-off level the differences across countries widen.  Only 20.2% of Japanese 
companies are controlled by a single large investor and less than one-tenth (9.7%) are controlled 
by families. An even more dramatic change takes place in Korea, where only 56.8% of 
companies are now controlled by large investors, and Taiwan, where 73.7% of companies now 
have a controlling large shareholder.  In the Indonesian sample, the share of family control 
increases at the expense of state, widely-held financial, and widely-held corporate control.  A 
similar pattern can be observed for Thailand where family control increases from 56.5% to 
61.6%, and Malaysia, where family control increases from 57.5% to 67.2%.  The most stable 
control structure between these two cut-off levels is observed for the Philippines and Singapore. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the concentration of cash-flow and voting rights of 
East Asian corporations in the hands of the largest controlling holder, and the separation of 
ownership and control.  Only companies that have a large investor holding at least 10% of the 
voting rights are included in panel A, while panel B includes companies where the largest 
shareholder holds at least 20% of the voting rights.  Among the 2,980 companies in the database, 
2,371 companies, or 79.5% of the total sample, enter panel A, and 1,654 companies, or 55.5% of 
the sample, are included in panel B.  Of those, cash-flow exceed voting rights for the largest 
shareholder for 1,101 and 674 companies, respectively.  The remaining companies do not have 
any deviations of voting from cash-flow rights.  The least number of companies where control 
exceeds ownership, both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the country sample, are 
found in Thailand. 
Thai corporations also display the most concentrated cash-flow rights, 36.577% on average, 
followed by Indonesian companies, with 27.712%, and Hong Kong companies, with 27.519%.  
Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese corporations have the least concentration of cash-flow rights,  15 
10.843%, 20.839%, and 20.215% respectively.  Across countries, the concentration of voting 
rights in the hands of the largest block-holder is similar to the concentration of cash-flow rights, 
with Thai and Indonesian companies having the highest concentration, 39.042% and 36.669% 
respectively, followed by Malaysian and Hong Kong companies, 31.633% and 31.834% 
respectively.  The least concentration of control is documented in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, 
15.801%, 23.942%, and 24.335% respectively.  The last three columns show the ratio of cash-
flow to voting rights, which we use as the measure of separation of ownership and control in the 
regression analysis.  The separation of control from ownership is on average the most 
pronounced in Japan (0.606), Indonesia (0.758), and Singapore (0.742), and the least in the 
Philippines (0.892) and Thailand (0.941).  A similar pattern of concentration and separation of 
cash-flow and voting rights is observed in panel B, except for Japan where the average ratio of 
cash-flow to voting rights increases from 0.606 to 0.814. 
The means by which cash-flow right are separated from control rights for the nine East 
Asian countries have been previously documented in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000).   
Deviations from one-share-one-vote rules are rare across East Asian countries.  On average, 
control of 20% of the vote can be achieved with 19.7% of the cash-flow rights.  Instead, 
pyramiding is most frequently used to de-couple cash-flow and control rights.  In particular, two-
thirds of Indonesian firms in the sample have pyramiding ownership structures, as have 
approximately half of the firm in the sample in Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
The smallest share of firms involved in pyramiding structures is recorded in Thailand.  Finally, 
10.7% of the firms in the sample have cross-holdings in other firms.  This percentage is the 
highest for firms in Singapore, Malaysia, and Japan, 15.7%, 14.9%, and 11.7% respectively, and 
the lowest for firms in Indonesia and Thailand, where less than 1% of firms have cross-holdings.   16 
 
IV.  Evidence of Expropriation 
Researchers have employed Tobin’s q to measure the discount in market values resulting 
from expropriation (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Barclay and Holderness, 1989; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Zingales, 1994, among others).  It is constructed as the market 
value of assets divided by the replacement cost of assets.  We follow the same definition here, 
using the book value of assets as a proxy for their replacement cost.  To control for industry-wide 
effects on firm valuation, previous papers most often use industry dummies in the regressions.  
Some papers also make adjustments to firms’ Tobin's q.  Specifically, they use the firm’s primary 
sector code to find matching firms and compare the firm’s Tobin’s q with the median Tobin’s q 
of the matching sample.   We use the first method to correct for industry-effects, but also conduct 
an alternative approach to correct for the effects of firms operating in different (and multiple) 
industries. 
To determine the primary industry in which the firm operates, we rely on the historical 
segment sales data collected by Worldscope.  If such information is not provided for a particular 
firm, we supplement the segment data from various issues of the Asian Company Handbook and 
the Japan Company Handbook.  We exclude a small number of firms from the sample because 
they do not report segment sales.  For the remaining firms, we determine the industry sectors to 
which firms belong according to the two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system, 
based on the largest share in sales revenues from the firm’s activity in each sector.
  We then used 
the broad industry group as defined by Campbell (1996) to classify firms into 12 industries.
8   
                                                 
8 The sectors are defined as follows: Petroleum industry (SIC 13 and 29); Finance and Real Estate (SIC 
60-69); Consumer Durables (SIC 25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, and 57); Basic Industry (SIC 10, 12, 14, 24, 26,  17 
We have a broad representation of industries in our sample (Table 4).  In terms of number 
of firms, we find that about 20% of the firms in our sample are primarily in the finance and real 
estate business and another 17% in the consumer durable industry.  About 12% of firms are in 
the basic industry, similar to the share of firms in the capital goods industry, 11%.   Next in 
importance follow firms in construction and utilities, followed by food and tobacco.  Industries 
with the smallest number of firms in our sample are petroleum and utilities.  
  We seek evidence regarding the following three hypotheses.  First, the value of the firm is 
expected to be increasing in the concentration of cash-flow rights in the hands of block-holders, 
as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  Second, a negative effect is expected on firm value 
from concentrated voting rights.  This is because once “large owners gain nearly full control of 
the company, they prefer to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority 
shareholders” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.759).   Third, as argued in Bebchuk et al. (1999), we 
expect to find that firm valuation is an increasing function in the ratio of cash-flow to voting 
rights, as the benefits of expropriation rise with the wedge between cash-flow and voting rights. 
We start by employing the following regression models for the year 1996, the year for 
which we have ownership data: 
(1)  TOBINQ = Intercept + b1*CASH + b2*SGROWTH +b3*CES + u  
(2)  TOBINQ = Intercept + b1*VOTES + b2*SGROWTH +b3*CES + u  
                                                                                                                                                             
28, 33); Food and Tobacco (SIC 1, 20, 21, 54); Construction (SIC 15-17, 32, 52); Capital Goods (SIC 34, 
35, and 38); Transportation (SIC 40-42, 44, 45, and 47); Utilities (SIC 46, 48, and 49); Textiles and 
Trade (SIC 22-23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59); Services (SIC 72-73, 75, 80, 82, 89); and Leisure (SIC 27, 58, 70, 
78-79).  18 
(3) TOBINQ = Intercept + b1*CASH + b2*VOTES + b3*(CASH/VOTES) + b4*SGROWTH 
+b5*CES + u  
where TOBINQ is Tobin's q, CASH is cash-flow rights of the largest block-holder, VOTES is the 
voting rights of the largest block-holder, and CASH/VOTES is the ratio of cash-flow to voting 
rights of the largest block-holder.  We include the growth of sales revenues over the years, 
SGROWTH, as a control variable, following La Porta et al. (1999b).  This ratio controls for the 
growth opportunities and the expected rate of return on investment the firms may have.  We also 
include capital expenditures over sales ratio, CES, as a control variable, following Lang and 
Stulz (1994).  This ratio accounts for investment opportunities available to the firm. We include 
industry dummies to adjust for the differences in Tobin's q across industries. We employ the 
ordinary least-square (OLS) method in the regression analysis, since the dependent variable is not 
limited.  
  The correlation matrix of all the variables used in the regression analysis (not shown) 
suggests small differences in the effect of concentrated control and cash-flow rights on corporate 
valuation. The raw correlation between CASH and VOTES is high, 0.852 in the sample of 
companies with a  controlling shareholder with at least 10% of the vote, and 0.774 in the sample 
of companies with a  controlling shareholder with at least 20% of the vote. This implies that we 
are unlikely to find significant support for the theory on control concentration. 
  The regression analysis excludes companies with dispersed ownership. One can see, 
however, whether such widely-held companies are less valuable than firms with concentrated 
ownership as the Jensen-incentive effect would suggest. This is indeed the case in our sample. 
We compare the values of Tobin’s q of widely-held companies with companies that have at least 
one shareholder with 10% of ownership, companies where the controlling shareholder has 20%  19 
or more ownership, and companies where the controlling shareholder has more than 30% of the 
cash-flow rights. In each pair-wise comparison, the value of widely-held corporations is lower, 
and this difference is statistically significant. There is also a gradation effect, where the 
difference is largest between widely-held companies and companies where the controlling 
shareholder has more than 30% of the ownership. In this instance, widely-held firms have a 18% 
average discount, and the difference in means is significant with a t-statistics of 4.67. 
We start with the sample of corporations which have a block-holder with at least 10% of 
votes.  We find that higher cash-flow rights by the largest block-holder are positively related to 
Tobin's q (Table 5, panel A).   The coefficient on the CASH variable is 0.05, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  The concentration of voting rights of the largest block-holder is 
positively, but not significantly, related to Tobin's q (column 2). This suggests that higher 
concentration of control per se does not necessarily lead to the expropriation of minority 
shareholders.  The separation of ownership and control yields a negative effect on market 
valuation the sign on CASH/VOTES is significantly positive (column 3), consistent with the 
hypothesis that deviations of voting from cash-flow rights are associated with expropriation.  The 
parameter estimate is 0.267 with a t-statistic of 6.35.  The regressions result suggests that, at the 
margin, a 10 percentage points increase in the separation between cash-flow and voting rights 
leads to a market discount of 3 percentage points.  In this specification, voting rights now a 
negative, but still not significant effect on market valuation.  We also find that market valuation 
is positively associated with sales growth, consistent with La Porta et al. (1999b).  Also, higher 
investment, as measured by capital expenditures over sales (CES), is associated with higher 
valuation, consistent with Lang and Stulz (1994).    Industry dummies (not reported) are (jointly) 
statistically significant in all our regressions. Firms in the Food and Tobacco, Textile and Trade,  20 
and Services industries have on average higher valuations than the sample average, while firms 
in the Finance and Utilities industries are valued at a relative discount. 
As a robustness check, we test whether these results are sensitive to the 10% cut-off in 
voting rights. We use the 20% cut-off (panel B) and find that the magnitude of the coefficients 
changes somewhat, but that none of the coefficients previously significant loses its statistical 
significance.  Comparing with Panel A, the only change is that coefficient for the voting rights 
variable becomes negative, but it remains statistically significant.  The coefficients for the ratio 
of cash flow rights to voting rights increases from 0.267 to 0.392.  Therefore, our findings do not 
depend on the particular cut-off chosen for voting rights. The higher coefficient for the ratio of 
cash flow rights to voting rights suggests that expropriation is more of an issue at higher levels of 
control. 
We experiment with alternative specifications of the proxy for expropriation incentives, 
using CASH – VOTES and CASH*(1 – VOTES) as robustness checks. The results remain 
qualitatively the same, where the CASH – VOTES specification has the highest statistical 
significance, with a coefficient of 0.013 and a t-statistic of 3.33.  
To investigate differences across time, and as a robustness check, we study the effects of 
cash-flow and voting rights on market valuation also for the year 1995 (Table 6).  The results are 
very similar to those found for 1996.  The only differences are that the coefficient for voting 
rights is now statistically significant positive when it is including as the only independent 
variable.  When both voting rights and the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights are included, 
the coefficient on voting rights is no longer statistically significant. 
We also run panel regressions on 1994-1996 financial data (but only 1996 ownership 
data), using OLS, fixed-effects, and random-effects models. The only qualitative difference in  21 
any of these specifications from the results reported here is that the coefficient on VOTES 
sometimes becomes negative, but never statistically significant. The random-effects model yields 
stronger evidence on the existence of the expropriation discount than the results in Table 5 (not 
reported). 
The results so far are consistent with the expropriation hypothesis, but do not yet shed 
light on whether a particular type of owner, and not the separation of ownership and control per 
se, is responsible for the results.  We therefore study separately the effects of ownership by 
families, financial institutions, corporations and the state on market valuation.  We use the 
similar regression as before and consider the effects of cash-flow and voting rights again 
separately, and as a ratio.  
As East Asian corporations are often characterized as family controlled, we investigate 
whether families are a major factor behind our finding of expropriation for those corporations 
where families are the largest control block-holder.  The number of corporations for which 
family is the largest block-holder is 1,139, or about half of the sample.  We find that the effect of 
family ownership concentration is qualitative very similar to those found for all classes of 
ownership combined, although the statistical significance is somewhat diminished (Table 7).  As 
before, we find weak, but not statistically significant, evidence of a positive impact of cash-flow 
rights, no evidence of impacts either way of voting rights on Tobin's q and strong evidence of 
negative impact of the separation of cash-flow and voting rights.
9  
                                                 
9  The idea that families are worse at expropriation of public shareholders in East Asia fits much casual 
empiricism. We study this hypothesis directly by pooling the data and testing for significant slope 
shifters associated with the controlling shareholder being a family. Indeed, we find this to be the case, as  22 
We next study ownership by financial institutions.  We find that cash-flow ownership by 
financial institutions is positively associated with corporate valuation, and that the separation of  
ownership and control brings about a valuation discount.   Control alone does not appear to affect 
market valuation as the coefficient on VOTES is not significant. For corporate ownership, we do 
not find statistically significant evidence to suggest that corporations, in their role as large 
shareholders, use the separation of ownership and control to expropriate minority shareholders.  
Neither cash flow rights nor control affects market valuation in a statistically significant way, nor 
does the ratio of the two variables.   The association between state cash flow rights and market 
valuation is statistically significant. We find that the coefficient for the deviation between cash 
flow rights and voting rights ratio is larger than for any of the other ownership classes, suggesting 
that the general lower market valuation arising from deviations between cash flow and control 
rights may in part arise from large state control.   
The results discussed in this section may be alternatively explained by the endogeneity of 
the ownership and control choice. This issue can, to some extent, be dismissed by saying that 
ownership is rather stable over time and does not vary much with investment opportunities. 
Nonetheless, the CASH/VOTES variable may be simply a dummy for pyramids and hence not 
directly related to previous theoretical results on one-share-one-vote. Firms at the bottom of the 
pyramid may have less attractive growth opportunities than firms at the top of the pyramid in 
ways that are not captured by the sales growth or investment-to-sales ratio. Such a pattern could 
explain both the positive coefficient on CASH and the positive coefficient on CASH/VOTES. 
                                                                                                                                                             
family control results in a value discount higher than the discounts associated with the other three 
ownership types.  23 
We address this issue in two ways. First, we re-run the regressions when excluding all 
firms that are parts of pyramidal structures. Since one-share-one-vote deviations are very rare in 
East Asia, the remaining firms achieve deviations of control and cash-flow rights primarily 
through the use of cross-holdings. In this smaller sample, we still find qualitatively the same 
results as in Table 5, as the coefficients on CASH and CASH/VOTES are positive and 
marginally statistically significant. The coefficient on VOTES remains insignificant.  
Second, we search for anecdotal accounts of pyramid formation in East Asia and the use 
of such pyramids by the controlling shareholder.
10 In particular, we attempt to distinguish the 
growth opportunities of firms at different levels of the pyramidal structure. If anything, the 
existing case-study literature supports our general finding that the separation of ownership and 
control through the use of pyramids is used by the controlling shareholder to expropriate value 
from the minority shareholders of companies at the lower levels of the pyramidal structure. The 
case-study evidence is summarized in Backman (1999, p.68) as follows: “(East) Asian 
conglomerates generally opt for the squat pyramidal structure. A private holding company sits at 
the apex, a second tier holds the most prized assets that are usually privately held, and a third tier 
comprises the group’s publicly listed companies. ...The publicly traded companies at the base of 
the pyramid serve as stalking horses for cash. They sell their shares to the public and then pass 
the proceeds up the pyramid via myriads of internal transactions. In return, other assets – less 
profitable and therefore less desired by the controlling family – are passed down the pyramid.” 
                                                 
10 A search on Lexis-Nexis identified more than 200 accounts of minority shareholder expropriation in 
the nine East Asian countries over the 1992-1996 period. Backman (1999) has over 40 studies of 
business group formation and their use to expropriate minority shareholders in the publicly-traded 
affiliates.  24 
 
V.  Country-Effects and Robustness Tests 
To investigate differences across countries, and as a robustness check, we study the 
effects of cash-flow and voting rights on market valuation in each country. Since the Japanese 
sample accounts for a large portion of the data set and Japanese ownership structures are quite 
different from that in the other East Asian countries, we investigate separately the effects of 
different types of owners in Japan on market valuation.  Since there are only 14 companies with 
significant state ownership in the Japanese sample, and since none of them have a separation of 
control from ownership, we exclude this ownership category from the analysis.  
Overall, higher concentration of cash-flow rights in Japan is associated with higher 
market valuation, and the separation of ownership and control is associated with a value discount 
(Table 7).  The results appear driven by ownership and control of financial institutions, where we 
find a positive effect of cash-flow rights and a strong positive effect of the ratio of cash-flow to 
voting rights.  In contrast, none of the coefficients for family or corporate ownership are 
statistically significant, which may in part reflect the smaller sample in the regressions.  These 
findings provide support for the results of Kang and Stulz (2000), who show that Japanese firms 
whose debt had a high fraction of bank loans in 1989 performed worse from 1990 to 1993, 
possibly as Japanese financial institutions extract a rent from their borrowers; and the findings of 
Morck and Nakamura (1999), who document that Japanese financial institutions do not provide 
good corporate governance. 
  The results for the other countries show that the expropriation hypothesis is not supported 
for the Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan samples, where none of the coefficients on the 
separation of voting from cash-flow rights are statistically significant (Table 9).  The results for  25 
Indonesia and Korea are significant for the cash flow rights, voting rights and cash-flow over 
voting rights variables.  For both countries, we find positive, statistically significant coefficients 
for all three variables, with the coefficient for the cash flow over voting rights variable very large 
in case of Indonesia, 0.875, suggesting a high degree of expropriation. This  may be due to the 
large role of families in ownership and the large separation between cash-flow rights and voting 
rights. For the Hong Kong sample, we find statistically significant results for the cash flow rights 
and the cash-flow over voting rights variables.  In case of the Philippine sample, the coefficient 
for the cash-flow over voting rights variables is quite large and significant, 0.561, suggesting a 
high degree of expropriation.   Finally, in Thailand, the cash-flow over voting rights variable is 
statistically significant positive. 
As a further robustness test, we explore the effect of firms operating in multiple industry 
segment simultaneously. As Lins and Servaes (1999) and Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang 
(1999) show, many East Asian firms have sales in multiple segments.  This could mean that our 
method of using industry dummies for the main segment in which each firm operates does not 
capture the effects of difference in industry-orientation completely.  To overcome these 
difficulties, we calculate an industry-adjusted, excess market valuation measure as the ratio of the 
firm’s actual market value to its imputed value. This excess value measure has often been used to 
evaluate the impact of firm diversification on market valuation, following on Berger and Ofek 
(1995).  It is also appropriate as a measure to study the effects of ownership structure on market 
values as it provides a relative value, by taking the ratio of market value to sales or assets, while 
adjusting (by construction) for industry differences.  We first present the formal procedure for 
constructing the excess variable measure and then follow with an example from the data.  26 
Specifically, the excess value variable, EXV, is calculated as follows.  First, we compute 
the market-to-sales ratio as the firm’s market capitalization, the stock price times the number of 
outstanding shares, divided by sales revenue.
11   We then multiply the industry-median ratio, 
defined as the median value of EXV among all single segment (including widely-held) firms in 
the industry, by the level of sales in each corresponding segment of a firm.  The imputed value of 
the firm is then obtained by summing the multiples across all segments.  We hence rely only 
sales data net of excise taxes (and stock market prices) in the construction of the valuation 
variable.  These are all flow figures and less affected by the differences in accounting standards 
across the sample countries.  All financial data are converted to US dollars using end-year 
exchange rates.  
We restrict the number of single-segment firms to be at least three when computing the 
median market-to-sales ratio of an industry.  When a two-digit SIC industry has fewer than three 
single-segment firms, we use the median ratio of the corresponding broad industry group as 
defined by Campbell (1996). When an industry, even defined broadly, has fewer than three 
single-segment firms, we use the median of all firms in the country.
12  Because of these data 
                                                 
11 Berger and Ofek (1995) calculate market values relative to both assets and sales by segment. Asian 
firms generally do not report assets breakdown by segments.  We therefore can calculate the ratio of 
market values to sales only. 
12 This procedure avoids the loss of observations but could introduce a bias in the excess value measure.  
The bias is inversely related to the availability of single-segment firms.  For most firms in our sample, we 
are able to find matching single-segment firms at the narrow or broad industry group level.  We therefore 
do not expect such bias to be significant.  27 
limitations, we end up with a slightly smaller sample of firms (2098 versus 2368 in our basic 
regression result. 
  We use Amsteel Corporation BHD, the third largest steel producer in Malaysia, to 
illustrate the excess value measure we construct (Table 10).  The market-to-sales ratio of Amsteel 
is 1.62, the ratio of total market capitalization (US$3,120 million) to total sales (US$1,929 
million).  We are able to identify nine steel producing Malaysian firms in the sample.  Their 
median market-to-sales ratio is 1.68.  Dividing Amsteel’s ratio by the median industry ratio for 
steel firms, we obtain the conventional industry-adjusted value, 0.96.  By this measure, Amsteel’s 
performance is roughly comparable to the rest of the industry. 
However, as shown in Panel B, steel sales accounts for only 24 percent of Amsteel’s total 
sales revenues.  The remaining 76 percent of revenues come from five other industries: retailing 
and distribution (23%), motors (23%), food and agricultural products (12%), computers (11%), 
and property development (7%).  Using the conventional method of matching firms by industry 
peers, the performance of the non-steel segments, which comprise three-quarters of the firm’s 
revenues, is left unadjusted.  Moreover, the matching firms could be diversified firms as well.  In 
fact, of the nine steel-producing firms in Malaysia, only four are single-segment firms.  The 
remaining five firms also operate in non-steel industries.  The median ratio computed for these 
firms thus does not properly reflect the valuation of the steel industry in Malaysia. 
  To mitigate these problems, we adjust industry performance at the segment level instead 
of the firm level.  For each of the Amsteel’s six segments, we restrict its industry-matching firms 
to be single-segment firms.  We first select firms that generate over 90 percent of revenues from 
one 2-digit SIC industry.  We find four such firms for the steel segment and five for the food and 
agricultural segment.  We are not able to find a sufficient number of single-segment firms for the  28 
remaining four segments.  For these segments, we search for single-segment firms within the 
broad industry groups as defined by Campbell (1996).  We are able to find at least three matching 
firms for all four segments. 
Once the appropriate matching firms are identified, we compute the median market-to-
sales ratios for each of the segments.  These ratios are reported in the last column of Panel B.  To 
obtain Amsteel’s imputed market-to-sales ratio, we multiply each of the segment ratios by the 
corresponding sales revenue fractions and sum the multiples across the six segments.  The 
imputed ratio is 2.50.  It is substantially higher than 1.68, the median market-to-sales ratio 
computed using the conventional method.  The difference derives from two sources.  First, the 
steel segment’s market-to-sales ratio (2.35), estimated from single-segment firms, is quite 
different from the ratio (1.68) computed in the conventional method which includes both single- 
and multi-segment firms.  Second, the six industries have different median market-to-sales ratios 
which range from 1.65 (the Motors segment) to 4.96 (the Property segment).  The weighted 
average across the six segments is thus higher than the conventional measure.  We next multiply 
Amsteel’s imputed market-to-sales ratio by total sales revenue to obtain the imputed valuation, 
US$4,823 million.  Dividing actual value by imputed value, we obtain a revised value ratio of 
0.65.  By this measure, Amsteel has considerably under-performed its industry peers.  
  Tables 11-13 provide the regression results corresponding to Tables 5, 8 and 9, but now 
using the EXV measure as the dependent variable instead of Tobin's q.  Otherwise, the 
specifications of the regressions are the same, except that we do not include the sales growth 
variable as an additional control variable (the sales growth variable is not clearly defined as we 
would need to use sales figures at the individual segment level).   The results of the main 
regression, Table 11, Panel A, are very similar to those of Table 5, Panel A.  Both cash flow  29 
rights and the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights have statistically significant positive 
coefficients.  The main difference is that the coefficient for the voting rights variable is now 
statistically significant negative when also included with the ratio variable and negative when 
included as the only ownership variable.  This suggests that there might be a direct negative 
effect of voting rights alone, not just when there are large deviations between cash flow rights 
and voting rights.  This is further suggested by the results of Panel B where the cut-off limit for 
control is raised to 20%.  In this specification, the coefficient for voting rights is statistically 
significant negative when included alone (and with the deviation variable).  It might be that the 
negative effects of control stakes occur at higher ownership stakes. This, together with the 
correction for the fact that firms operate in multiple segments, may explain why we now find this 
negative effect.  
  Investigating the country-specific regression results, we find that the main results are 
confirmed.  In Japan (Table 12), for the full sample, cash flow rights are positive related to 
excess value, while voting rights are negatively related when also including the ratio of cash flow 
rights to voting rights.  The ratio itself  has a positive statistically significant coefficient, with a 
value about twice as high as compared to the regression results when using Tobin's q.  As before, 
we find that the results may be due to ownership by financial institutions. There are no 
statistically significant effects for the other ownership classes. 
  The results for the other countries using excess value as dependent variable show a 
similar change compared to the results using Tobin's q (Table 13).  For the Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Taiwan samples, none of the coefficients on cash flow rights, voting rights and the separation 
of voting from cash-flow rights are statistically.  The results for Hong Kong are significant for 
the cash flow rights, voting rights and cash-flow over voting rights variables.  We find a negative,  30 
statistically significant coefficients for voting rights and a positive statistically significant 
coefficient for the cash flow over voting rights variable.  In case of Indonesia, Philippines and 
Thailand, we find very large significant coefficients for the cash flow over voting rights variable, 
1.530, 1.425 and 1.552 respectively. For Korea sample, we find a statistically significant result 
for the cash-flow over voting rights variable, which is similar in magnitude.   
 
VI.   Conclusions 
This paper documents the relation between concentration of ownership and control and 
their separation, on the one hand, and market valuation, on the other hand.  We find that higher 
cash-flow rights are associated with higher market valuation, but higher voting rights with lower 
market valuation.  The separation of control from ownership is associated with lower market 
values, which we interpret as evidence of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders.  Studying individual ownership classes, we find that all ownership concentration 
classes except for corporations are behind the negative relation between deviations of cash flow 
rights from control rights and market valuation. In Japan separation of cash-flow and voting 
rights in the hands of financial institutions lowers market valuation.  This dollar value is in turn a 
good proxy for the decrease in utility levels of minority shareholders, the ultimate variable on 
which economic inefficiency depends. The results on expropriation are the confirmed for most of 
the individual country samples. We conclude that the risk of expropriation is the major principal-
agent problem for large publicly-traded corporations. This risk may lead to large social costs, as 
profitable investment opportunities are foregone for lack of equity financing. 
It is likely that the degree to which certain ownership structures are associated with 
expropriation depends on country-specific circumstances.   These may include the quality of  31 
banking systems, the legal and judicial protection of individual shareholders, and the degree of 
financial disclosure required.  The exact magnitude to which these institutional variables affect 
the degree of expropriation is an issue of important policy relevance and of potential future 
research.   
Several interesting questions merit further investigation. First, what ways to restrict the 
separation of ownership and control are most effective in balancing the effects of improved 
monitoring, as a result of ownership concentration, with the risks of expropriation? Second, the 
fact that expropriation exists leaves unanswered the question why minority shareholders invest in 
companies if they fear (and rationally so) expropriation in the future.  One answer could be that 
these shareholders face limited investment opportunities.  While they may fear expropriation, 
other investment alternatives do not yield higher risk-adjusted  returns.  A financially repressed 
financial system, for example, with low bank deposit rates and limited capital account 
convertibility might well mean that the net returns on stocks are still attractive, even though there 
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Table 1:  Cross-Holdings among the Main Companies in the Fuyo Group 
(in percentage) 
 
This table shows the cross-holdings among the main members of the Fuyo group, the fourth largest keiretsu in Japan. The rows show 
ownership and control in the respective column entries. Cash-flow rights are denoted with “C” and voting rights are denoted with “V.” 
For example, Fuji Bank has C&V 4.9% in Oki Electric, C&V 16.8% in Yasuda Trust Bank, etc. Marubeni Corporation has C&V 0.4% 














Nippon Seiko  Nihon Cement Showa Denko  Nippon Kokkan 
 
Fuji Bank  --  C&V 4.9  C&V 16.8  C&V 4.7  C&V 5.0  C&V 4.1  C&V 4.8  C 4.1; V 5.3  -- 
Oki Electric  C&V 7.5  --  C&V 3.4  C&V 0.8  C&V 2.6  C&V 0.9  C&V 1.0  C&V 1.1  -- 
Yasuda Trust Bank  C&V 2.8  C&V 4.9  --  C&V 5.1  C&V 4.9  C&V 7.2  C&V 2.9  C&V 2.3  -- 
Marubeni Corp.  C&V 0.4  C&V 0.3  C&V 2.4  --  C&V 6.0  --  --  --  C&V 1.7 
Yasuda F&M  C&V 1.2  C&V 7.0  C&V 2.2  C&V 3.9  --  C&V 6.2  C&V 2.1  C&V 5.1  C&V 2.3 
Nippon Seiko  C&V 1.1  C&V 0.6  C&V 1.1  C&V 0.3  --  --  --  --  C&V 1.9 
Nihon Cement  C&V 1.5  C&V 1.1  C&V 1.4  C&V 0.2  C&V 0.9  --  --  C&V 0.9  C&V 1.4 
Showa Denko  C&V 1.0  --  --  C&V 0.4  C&V 0.6  --  C&V 0.9  --  C&V 1.1 
Nippon Kokkan  --  C&V 1.0  C&V 1.0  --  --  C&V 1.2  C&V 0.7  C&V 0.7  -- 
Yasuda Life 
Insurance 
C&V 4.4  C&V 7.5  C&V 8.6  C 4.7; V 6.5  C&V 4.2  C&V 4.4  C&V 5.2  C 4.8; V 5.6  C&V 5.1  39 
Table 2:  Control of Publicly-Traded Companies in East Asia 
(percentage of the total number of companies in the sample) 
 
Newly-assembled data for 2,980 publicly-traded corporations (including both financial 
institutions and non-financial institutions) are based on Worldscope, supplemented with 
information from the Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the Japan Company Handbook 
1999 (1998),  the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  and the 
Singapore Investment Guide (1998). In all cases, we collect the ownership structure as of 
December 1996 or the end of the 1996 fiscal year. 
 
Of which  Country Number  of 
Corporations 
in Sample 
Share of Firms 
under Ultimate 
Control 




10% cut-off for voting rights of the largest shareholder 
Hong  Kong 330  99.4  64.7 3.7 7.1  23.9 
Indonesia  178 99.4 68.6 10.2  3.8 16.8 
Japan  1240  58.0 13.1  1.1 38.5  5.3 
Korea  345  85.7  67.9 5.1 3.5 9.2 
Malaysia  238 99.0 57.5 18.2 12.1 11.2 
Philippines  120 98.4 42.1  3.6 16.8 35.9 
Singapore  221 98.6 52.0 23.6 10.8 12.2 
Taiwan  141 97.1 65.6  3.0 10.4 18.1 
Thailand  167 97.9 56.5  7.5 12.8 21.1 
20% cut-off for voting rights of the largest shareholder 
Hong  Kong 330  93.1  66.7 1.4 5.2  19.8 
Indonesia  178  94.9  71.5 8.2 2.0  13.2 
Japan  1240  20.2 9.7 0.8 6.5 3.2 
Korea  345  56.8  48.4 1.6 0.7 6.1 
Malaysia  238 89.6 67.2 13.4  2.3  6.7 
Philippines  120  80.9  44.6 2.1 7.5  26.7 
Singapore  221 94.5 55.4 23.5  4.1 11.5 
Taiwan  141  73.7  48.2 2.8 5.3  17.4 
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Table 3: Separation of Cash-Flow and Voting Rights in East Asian Corporations (Largest Control Holder) 
The newly-assembled data for 2,980 publicly-traded corporations (including both financial institutions and non-financial institutions) are collected from 
Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook, the Japan Company Handbook, the Securities Exchange of Thailand Companies Handbook (1998),  the Singapore 
Investment Guide (1998). In all cases, the data are as of December 1996 or the end of the 1996 fiscal year.  A company needs to have an ultimate controlling 
owner to be included in this table. Panel A includes only companies with an investor who holds at least 10% of the voting rights, Panel B only companies with an 
investor who holds at least a 20% of the voting rights.  
Panel A: Companies With an Investor Who Holds at Least 10% of Voting Rights 
Number of 
Corporations 









Median Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Median Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Hong  Kong  327  89  27.519 11.878 26.000 31.834 11.335 29.000  0.873  0.225  1.000 
Indonesia  177  108  27.712 13.264 26.000 36.669 11.692 36.000  0.758  0.248  0.809 
Japan  706  454  10.843  10.608 8.000  15.801 8.624  12.000 0.606 0.350 0.600 
Korea  293  80  20.839 9.533  20.000  23.942 9.334  23.000 0.882 0.216 1.000 
Malaysia  237  94  26.245 12.289 24.000 31.633 11.110 32.000  0.831  0.232  1.000 
Philippines  117  40  25.068 12.202 23.000 27.894 11.354 25.000  0.892  0.197  1.000 
Singapore  215  150  23.009 11.492 22.000 30.395 10.364 31.000  0.742  0.221  0.750 
Taiwan  135  61  20.215 10.335 21.000 24.335  9.612 23.000  0.815  0.225  1.000 
Thailand  164  25  36.577 13.294 36.000 39.042 12.779 42.000  0.941  0.161  1.000 
East  Asia  2,371  1,101  21.296 13.794 20.000 26.173 12.928 24.000  0.773  0.291  1.000 
Panel B: Companies With an Investor Who Holds at Least 20% of Voting Rights 









Median Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Median Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Hong  Kong  303  88  28.554 11.711 26.000 33.194 10.634 31.000  0.864  0.231  1.000 
Indonesia  166  107  28.698 13.077 26.000 38.195 10.383 41.000  0.747  0.244  0.781 
Japan  238  84  21.293 11.912 20.000 25.356  8.771 20.000  0.814  0.301  1.000 
Korea  195  64  24.738 9.251  24.000  28.907 7.360  26.000 0.857 0.229 1.000 
Malaysia  212  89  27.797 12.051 26.000 33.737  9.784 32.000  0.817  0.238  1.000 
Philippines  94  36  28.181 11.604 25.000 31.524  9.594 31.000  0.879  0.208  1.000 
Singapore  195  137  24.369 11.162 22.000 32.143  9.214 32.000  0.743  0.220  0.750 
Taiwan  98  45  23.888 9.528  23.500  28.551 7.846  25.500 0.829 0.203 1.000 
Thailand  153  24  38.264 12.095 36.300 40.874 11.154 42.000  0.942  0.164  1.000 
East  Asia  1,654  674  27.084  12.302 25.000 32.348 10.541 31.000  0.829  0.241  1.000  41 
Table 4: The Sample of Firms by Industry 
This table shows the distribution of sample firms across industries. All firms, including those without an ultimate controlling owner are included. 
The industrial classification is based on Campbell (1996). The sectors are defined as follows: Petroleum industry (SIC 13 and 29); Finance and 
Real Estate (SIC 60-69); Consumer Durables (SIC 25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, and 57); Basic Industry (SIC 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33); Food and 
Tobacco (SIC 1, 20, 21, 54); Construction (SIC 15-17, 32, 52); Capital Goods (SIC 34, 35, and 38); Transportation (SIC 40-42, 44, 45, and 47); 
Utilities (SIC 46, 48, and 49); Textiles and Trade (SIC 22-23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59); Services (SIC 72-73, 75, 80, 82, 89); and Leisure (SIC 27, 58, 

















Transportation Utilities Textiles  and 
Trade 
Services Leisure Total 
Hong  Kong  1 100  57 10 13 22 22  20 9  44  6  26  330 
Indonesia  1  46 18 24 20  4  12  4  5  33  7 4  178 
Japan  22  159 247 173  79  111 203  60  26 87  51 22  1240 
Korea  12 61 59 55 20 44 35  6  6  35  4 8  345 
Malaysia  4  61 17 22 17 49  8  10 9  15 15  11  238 
Philippines  6 41 7 14  18 11 3  1 8  6  3  2  120 
Singapore  3  45 44 16 18 14 21  12 4 9  15  20  221 
Taiwan  2  11 28 24 15 14 16  6  2  17  4 2  141 
Thailand  1  55 29 12 11 16  6  5  7  10  7 8  167 
East  Asia  52  579 506 350 211 285 326  124 76  256 112  103  2980  42 
Table 5:  Cash-Flow Rights, Voting Rights, and Firm Value 
 
This table presents the regression results for the relationship between firm valuation (TOBINQ) and the 
distribution of cash-flow and control rights.  The independent variables include the share of cash-flow 
rights held by the largest block-holder (CASH), the share of voting rights held by the largest block-holder 
(VOTES), and the ratio of cash flow to voting rights (CASH/VOTES). Total capital expenditures over 
sales (CES) is included as a control variable. The growth of sales revenue over the year (SGROWTH) is 
also included as a control variable. The regressions are performed on the full sample using the ordinary 
least-square method.  All data are for 1996. Companies which do not have a block-holder with at least 
10% of the vote or which do not report capital expenditures are excluded from Panel A. Companies 
which do not have a block-holder with at least 20% of the vote or which do not report capital 
expenditures or stock prices are excluded from Panel B. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported under 
the coefficients. An intercept term is included in all regressions (not shown). The 12 industry dummies 
described in Table 4 are used as independent variables, with the Leisure sector as a numeraire (not 
shown). 
Panel A 
Explanatory Variable  TOBINQ  TOBINQ  TOBINQ 
      
CASH 0.005**     
 3.93     
VOTES   0.002  -0.002 
   1.46  0.16 
CASH/VOTES     0.267** 
     6.35 
SGROWTH 0.267*  0.290*  0.264* 
 2.35  2.30  2.21 
CES 0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
 4.18  4.38  4.86 
      
Number of Observations  2,368  2,368  2,368 
Adjusted R
2 0.059  0.052  0.063 
Panel B 
 
Explanatory Variable  TOBINQ  TOBINQ  TOBINQ 
      
CASH 0.004**     
 2.45     
VOTES   -0.002  -0.003 
   0.96  1.56 
CASH/VOTES     0.392** 
     5.93 
SGROWTH 0.423**  0.444**  0.451** 
 4.73  4.92  5.12 
CES 0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
 2.28  2.57  3.25 
      
Number of Observations  1,650  1,650  1,650 
Adjusted R
2 0.051  0.047  0.062 
*  and **  represent significance at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.  43 
 
Table 6:  Robustness Check on  Firm Value 
(financial data for 1995) 
This table presents the regression results for the relationship between firm valuation (TOBINQ) and the 
distribution of cash-flow and control rights.  The independent variables include the share of cash-flow 
rights held by the largest block-holder (CASH), the share of voting rights held by the largest block-holder 
(VOTES), and the ratio of cash flow to voting rights (CASH/VOTES). Total capital expenditures over 
sales (CES) is included as a control variable. The growth of sales revenue over the year (SGROWTH) is 
also included as a control variable. The regressions are performed on the full sample using the ordinary 
least-square method.  All data are for 1995. Companies which do not have a block-holder with at least 
10% of the vote or which do not report capital expenditures are excluded from Panel A. Companies 
which do not have a block-holder with at least 20% of the vote or which do not report capital 
expenditures or stock prices are excluded from Panel B. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported under 
the coefficients. An intercept term is included in all regressions (not shown). The 12 industry dummies 
described in Table 4 are used as independent variables, with the Leisure sector as a numeraire (not 
shown). 
Panel A 
Explanatory Variable  TOBINQ  TOBINQ  TOBINQ 
      
CASH 0.007**     
 6.04     
VOTES   0.005**  0.003 
   2.91  1.63 
CASH/VOTES     0.293** 
     6.39 
SGROWTH 0.243**  0.254**  0.245** 
 3.21  3.28  3.19** 
CES 0.002**  0.002**  0.002 
 6.44  6.37  6.70 
      
Number of Observations  2,011  2,011  2,011 
Adjusted R
2 0.074  0.062  0.076 
Panel B 
 
Explanatory Variable  TOBINQ  TOBINQ  TOBINQ 
      
CASH 0.006**     
 3.29     
VOTES   0.004  -0.001 
   0.20  0.43 
CASH/VOTES     0.411** 
     5.44 
SGROWTH 0.273**  0.286**  0.312** 
 2.89  2.97  3.23 
CES 0.002**  0.002**  0.002** 
 4.62  4.71  5.30 
      
Number of Observations  1,366  1,366  1,366 
Adjusted R
2 0.052  0.043  0.061  44 
*  and **  represent significance at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 45 
Table 7:  Cash-Flow and Voting Rights, and Firm Valuation 
(By Ownership Types) 
 
This table presents the regression results of the relationship between firm valuation (TOBINQ) and the concentration of cash-flow and control rights.  The 
independent variables include the share of cash-flow rights held by the largest block-holder (CASH), the share of voting rights held by the largest block-holder 
(VOTES), and the ratio of cash flow to voting rights (CASH/VOTES). Total capital expenditures over sales (CES) is included as a control variable. The growth 
of sales revenue over the year (SGROWTH) is also included as a control variable. The regressions are performed on the sample using the ordinary least-
square method.  All data are for 1996. Companies which do not have a block-holder with at least 10% of the vote or which do not report capital expenditures are 
excluded. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported under the coefficients. An intercept term is included in all regressions (not shown). The 12 industry dummies 




Family Ownership  Financial Institutions  Corporations  The State or Municipality  Explanatory Variable 
TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ 
              
CASH  0.003     0.007**     0.005     0.009**    
  1.79     2.49     1.18     2.64    
VOTES    -0.001  0.001   0.001  -0.003   0.003  0.003    0.005  0.005 
    0.65 0.43    0.34 1.09    0.93 0.81    1.71 1.48 
CASH/VOTES     0.271**     0.313**     0.263     0.632** 
     3.16     4.05     1.15     2.60 
SGROWTH  0.242 0.243 0.248  0.489**  0.612**  0.565**  0.167 0.162 0.168  0.552*  0.523*  0.611* 
  1.71 1.64 1.59 2.51 3.06 3.01 0.94 0.91 0.96 2.08 1.97 2.20 
CES  0.001*  0.001*  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.003*  0.003**  0.003* 
  2.17 2.38 2.94 2.76 2.79 2.89 1.61 1.65 1.68 2.46 2.51 2.36 
              
Observations  1,319  1,319  1,319  561 561 561 302 302 302 176 176 176 
Adjusted R
2  0.027 0.024 0.031 0.158 0.147 0.172 0.059 0.056 0.055 0.132 0.110 0.132 
 
* and **  represent significance at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 8:  Cash-Flow and Voting Rights, and Firm Valuation in Japan 
(By Ownership Types) 
 
This table presents the regression results of the relationship between firm valuation (TOBINQ) and the concentration of cash-flow and control rights.  The 
independent variables include the share of cash-flow rights held by the largest block-holder (CASH), the share of voting rights held by the largest block-holder 
(VOTES), and the ratio of cash flow to voting rights (CASH/VOTES). Total capital expenditures over sales (CES) is included as a control variable. The growth 
of sales revenue over the year (SGROWTH) is also included as a control variable. The regressions are performed on the sample using the ordinary least-
square method.  All data are for 1996. Companies which do not have a block-holder with at least 10% of the vote or which do not report capital expenditures are 
excluded. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported under the coefficients. An intercept term is included in all regressions (not shown). The 12 industry dummies 
described in Table 4 are used as independent variables, with the Leisure sector as a numeraire (not shown). There are only 14 companies with significant state 




Full Sample  Family Ownership  Financial Institutions  Corporations  Explanatory Variable 
TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ TOBINQ 
              
CASH  0.004*     -0.002     0.017**     0.003    
  2.07     0.42     4.19     0.74    
VOTES    0.001  -0.003   -0.002  -0.002   0.001  -0.002    0.001  0.002 
    0.54 1.10    0.45 0.44    0.30 0.48    0.61 0.51 
CASH/VOTES     0.245**     0.224     0.342**     0.226 
     4.10     1.00     3.84     0.63 
SGROWTH  1.192** 1.213** 1.212** 1.586** 1.584**  1.564  0.912** 0.913** 0.961**  0.309  0.326  0.302 
  5.64 5.66 5.85 3.38 3.37 3.32 3.53 3.42 3.79 0.54 0.55 0.52 
CES  0.001** 0.001** 0.001**  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.001** 0.001** 0.001**  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  2.79 2.58 2.82 1.28 1.28 1.28 3.10 2.64 2.89 0.16 0.12 0.27 
              
Observations  706 706 706 153 153 153 481 481 481  58  58  58 
Adjusted R
2  0.142 0.136 0.155 0.084 0.085 0.079 0.219 0.189 0.229 0.021 0.023 0.020 
 
* and **  represent significance at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 9:  Cash-Flow and Voting Rights, and Firm Valuation (By Country) 
The dependent variable is firm valuation (TOBINQ), the independent variables include the share of cash-flow rights (CASH), the share of voting rights (VOTES), the ratio of 
cash flow to voting rights (CASH/VOTES), a control variable for total capital expenditures over sales (CES). The growth of sales revenue over the year (SGROWTH) is also 
included as a control variable. The regressions are performed using the ordinary least-square method.  All data are for 1996 and companies where the largest block-holder has 
less than 10% of voting rights are excluded.  Absolute values of t-statistics are reported. An intercept term is included in all regressions (not shown). The 12 industry dummies 
described in Table 4 are used as independent variables, with the Leisure sector as a numeraire (not shown). 
Explanatory Variable  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia 
CASH  0.008**     0.019**     0.014**     0.008    
  2.79     5.69     2.96     1.04     
VOTES    0.004  0.005   0.007*  0.009**   0.008*  0.010*    0.002  0.002 
    1.62 1.89    2.14 2.78    2.12 2.42    0.34 0.33 
CASH/VOTES     0.400**     0.875**     0.468**     0.317 
     3.52     6.18     3.03     0.45 
SGROWTH  0.278 0.242 0.292 0.302 0.287  0.408*  0.352*  0.387*  0.336*  0.753 0.739 0.737 
  1.69 1.45 1.80 1.39 1.28 1.98 1.97 2.08 1.98 1.64 1.68 1.67 
CES  0.021 0.001 0.040 0.032 0.021 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  0.102  0.48 0.18 0.24 0.79 0.22 0.72 0.86 0.60 1.28 1.22 1.28 
 
Observations  327 327 327 177 177 177 293 293 293 237 237 237 
Adjusted R
2  0.038 0.021 0.044 0.289 0.162 0.302 0.108 0.087 0.109 0.019 0.012 0.014 
Explanatory Variable  The Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
              
CASH  0.009     0.002     0.003     0.003     
  1.90     0.69     0.62     0.93     
VOTES    0.006 0.005    -0.005  -0.005    0.002 0.001    0.001 0.002 
    1.25 1.11    1.25 1.33    0.36 0.24    0.31 0.43 
CASH/VOTES     0.561*     0.031     0.254     0.372* 
     1.97     0.168     1.20     2.06 
SGROWTH  0.482*  0.445*  0.517**  -0.172  -0.149  -0.142 0.442 0.449 0.459 0.091 0.090 0.086 
  2.15 1.97 2.36 0.64 0.56 0.56 1.32 1.30 1.35 1.59 1.64 1.62 
CES  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002*  0.002*  0.002**  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  0.54 0.38 0.77 0.62 0.64 0.62 1.96 1.98 2.06 0.29 0.21 0.42 
 
Observations  117 117 117 212 212 212 135 135 135 164 164 164 
Adjusted R
2  0.018 0.011    0.041 0.046 0.043 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.148 0.143 0.146 
and ** represent significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  48 
 
Table 10:  Construction of the Valuation Measure  
 
Panel A reports basic statistics of Amsteel Corporation and the Malaysian steel industry.  Total 
capitalization is the market value of common equity plus the book value of debt.  The market to 
sales (MTS) ratio is total capitalization divided by total sales.  The imputed capitalization is the 
firm's total sales multiplied by its imputed MTS ratio.  The calculation of the imputed MTS ratio 
is illustrated in Panel B.   
 
Panel A:  Industry-adjusted performance of Amsteel Corporation 
 
Total capitalization of Amsteel Corporation (US$ million)  3,120 
Total sales of Amsteel Corporation (US$ million)  1,929 
Market-to-sales ratio of Amsteel Corporation  1.62 
Median MTS ratio of steel producing firms in Malaysia  
(4 single-segment and 5 multi-segment firms) 
1.68 
Conventional industry adjusted value of Amsteel  
(MTS ratio of Amsteel / Median MTS ratio of steel firms) 
0.96 
MTS ratio of Amsteel imputed from single-segment comparables (See Panel B)  2.50 
Imputed capitalization  of Amsteel (Imputed MTS ratio*Total sales; US$ million)  4,823 
Excess value, EXV,  of Amsteel (Actual capitalization / imputed capitalization)  0.65 
 
 
Panel B: Imputing Amsteel's market to sales ratio from single-segment peers 
 









peers 2-digit SIC 
industry 
















            
Steel  33 462 0.24 4 2.35 9 3.03  2.35 
Retail & Distribution  54  445  0.23  0  N.A.  8  2.51  2.51 
Motors  55 442 0.23 0 N.A. 5  1.65 1.65 
Food & Agricultural  20  236  0.12  5  2.20  8  2.51  2.20 
Computers  35 215 0.11 1 N.A. 6  3.35 3.35
 
Property 67  129  0.07  1  N.A.  22  4.96  4.96 
            
Firm-level  value   1,929  1.00       2.50 
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Table 11:  Cash-Flow Rights, Voting Rights, and Firm Value 
 
This table presents the regression results for the relationship between excess valuation (EXV) and the 
distribution of cash-flow and control rights.  The independent variables include the share of cash-flow 
rights held by the largest block-holder (CASH), the share of voting rights held by the largest block-holder 
(VOTES), and the ratio of cash flow to voting rights (CASH/VOTES). Total capital expenditures over 
sales (CES) is included as a control variable. The regressions are performed on the full sample using the 
ordinary least-square method.  All data are for 1996. Companies which do not have a block-holder with 
at least 10% of the vote or which do not report capital expenditures are excluded from Panel A. 
Companies which do not have a block-holder with at least 20% of the vote or which do not report capital 
expenditures or stock prices are excluded from Panel B. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported under 
the coefficients. An intercept term is included in all regressions (not shown).  
Panel A 
Explanatory Variable  EXV  EXV  EXV 
      
CASH 0.498**     
 3.95     
VOTES   -0.216  -0.607** 
   1.58  4.45 
CASH/VOTES     0.591** 
     10.94 
CES 0.129**  0.198**  0.175** 
 3.50  5.22  4.67 
      
Number of Observations  2,098  2,098  2,098 
Adjusted R
2 0.014  0.012  0.054 
Panel B 
 
Explanatory Variable  EXV  EXV  EXV 
      
CASH 0.684**     
 3.96     
VOTES   -0.426*  -0.607** 
   2.07  3.04 
CASH/VOTES     0.700** 
     9.38 
CES 0.085  0.158**  0.167** 
 1.63  2.93  3.20 
      
Number of Observations  1,465  1,465  1,465 
Adjusted R
2 0.011  0.042  0.047 
*  and **  represent significance at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 12:  Cash-Flow and Voting Rights, and Expropriation in Japan 
(By Ownership Types) 
 
This table presents the regression results of the relationship between excess valuation (EXV) and the concentration of cash-flow and control rights.  The 
independent variables include the share of cash-flow rights held by the largest block-holder (CASH), the share of voting rights held by the largest block-holder 
(VOTES), and the ratio of cash flow to voting rights (CASH/VOTES). Total capital expenditures over sales (CES) is used as a control variable. The regressions 
are performed on the sample using the ordinary least-square method.  All data are for 1996. Companies which do not have a block-holder with at least 10% of the 
vote or which do not report capital expenditures or stock returns are excluded. State ownership is also excluded as a category as only 14 firms are controlled by 
the state and none of them has a separation of cash-flow and control rights. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported under the coefficients. An intercept term is 




Full Sample  Family Ownership  Financial Institutions  Corporations  Explanatory Variable 
EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV 
              
CASH  0.705**     -0.725     0.028**     -0.179    
  2.51    1.04    5.62     0.276     
VOTES   0.452  -0.846*   -0.908  -0.912  -0.188  -0.757  -0.391  -0.487 
    0.13 2.37    1.32 1.33    0.34 1.46    0.54 0.65 
CASH/VOTES     0.502**     0.536     0.634**     0.394 
     7.01     1.86     7.14     0.80 
CES  0.172** 0.157** 0.163**  0.213  0.212  0.218  0.194** 0.177** 0.170**  0.206  0.201  -0.051 
  3.49 3.18 3.43 1.53 1.49 1.51 3.70 3.31 3.38 0.05 0.02 0.24 
 
Observations  654 654 654 136 136 136 456 456 456  40  40  40 
Adjusted R
2  0.025 0.012 0.076 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.072 0.019 0.109 -0.051 0.009 -0.056 
 
* and **  represent significance at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Table 13:  Cash-Flow and Voting Rights, and Expropriation (By Country) 
The dependent variable is excess valuation (EXV), the independent variables include the share of cash-flow rights (CASH), the share of voting rights (VOTES), 
the ratio of cash flow to voting rights (CASH/VOTES), a control variable for total capital expenditures over sales (CES). The regressions are performed using the 
ordinary least-square method.  All data are for 1996 and companies where the largest block-holder has less than 10% of voting rights are excluded.  Absolute 
values of t-statistics are reported. An intercept term is included in all regressions (not shown).  
 
Hong Kong  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Explanatory Variable 
EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV 
               
CASH  -0.636     1.711**     0.010     0.638    
  1.35    4.25    1.80    1.19    
VOTES    -0.017**  -0.016**   -0.462  -0.301  -0.301  -0.001  0.296  0.311 
   3.69  3.50  1.05  0.73  0.57  0.02   0.508  0.53 
CASH/VOTES     0.433*     1.530**     0.513**     0.405 
     2.15     8.37     2.58     1.70 
CES  0.424*  0.733*  0.790*  0.435 0.631 0.399 0.187 0.221 0.202  0.675**  0.681**  0.674** 
  2.05 2.14 2.25 1.46 1.95 1.36 1.68 1.96 1.79 3.58 3.68 3.54 
 
Observations  327 327 327 177 177 177 178 178 178 237 237 237 
Adjusted R
2  0.016 0.054 0.062 0.101 0.019 0.255 0.029  0.0130  0.039 0.043 0.035 0.043 
The Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  Explanatory Variable 
EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV EXV 
              
CASH  0.407     0.504     1.418*     0.764    
  0.77    1.09    1.99    1.73    
VOTES   -0.712  -0.924  -0.179  -0.367  1.239  0.953  -0.449  -0.243 
    1.48 1.93    0.38 0.77    1.36 1.23    0.97 0.57 
CASH/VOTES     1.425**     0.498     0.512     1.552** 
     6.87     1.77     1.11     9.02 
CES  -0.003  -0.003  -0.019 0.119 0.188 0.185  0.738**  0.713**  0.772*  0.419 0.457 0.402 
  1.29 1.30 0.82 0.69 1.12 0.85 2.46 2.60 2.37 1.52 1.54 1.37 
 
Observations  97 97 97  206  206  206  89 89 89  133  133  133 
Adjusted R
2  0.062 0.072 0.144 -0.048  -0.087 0.013 0.082 0.074 0.078 0.033 0.029 0.119 
* and ** represent significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  52 
Table A1: Sources of Ownership and Control Data for East Asian Firms 
    
 
    
Country  Immediate Ownership Data  Dual-Class Shares  Business Groups: Pyramids and Cross-Holdings 
      
Hong Kong  Worldscope 
 
Asian Company Handbook 
 
Hong Kong Company Handbook 1997 
Datastream  Chu, Yin-Wah and Gary Hamilton, 1993, Business Networks in Hong 
Kong, University of California, Davis, mimeo. 
 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1992, Have Cash, Will Travel, March 
5, Special Section on the Li ka-Shing Conglomerate 
 




Asian Company Handbook 
 




Handbook of Indonesian Companies 
1996 
Fisman, Ray, 1998, Announcement Effects of Suharto’s Illnesses on 
Related Companies, Working paper, Harvard Business School.  
 
W.I.Carr Banque Indosuez Group, 1997, Indonesian Group 
Connections, Jakarta, Indonesia 
 
Indobusiness, 1998, 1995 Ranking of Indonesian Largest 





Japan Company Handbook 
Datastream  Dodwell Marketing Consultants, 1997, Industrial Groupings in Japan: 
the Anatomy of the “Keiretsu,” 12
th Edition, 1996/1997, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
Sato, Kazuo, 1984, “The Anatomy of Japanese Businesses,” 
M.E.Sharpe, Chapter 4. 
 
Korea (South)  Worldscope 
 
Asian Company Handbook 
Datastream  Korean Fair Trade Commission, 1997, 1996 List of Largest 30 
Chaebol, Seoul, Korea. 
 
Lim, Ungki, 1998, Ownership Structure and Family Control in Korean 
Conglomerates: with Cases of the 30 Largest Chaebol, Seoul 
University, Korea.  53 




Country  Immediate Ownership Data  Dual-Class Shares  Business Groups: Pyramids and Cross-Holdings 
Philippines Worldscope 
 
Asian Company Handbook 
 
Philippine Stock Exchange 
Investments Guide 1997 
Datastream 
 
Philippine Stock Exchange 
Investments Guide 1997 
Philippine Stock Exchange, 1997,  Investment Guide 1996, Manila. 
 
Tan, Edita, 1993, Interlocking Directorates, Commercial Banks, Other 
Financial Institutions, and Non-Bank Corporations, Philippine Review 




Asian Company Handbook 
Datastream 
 
Singapore Investment Guide 1997 
Singapore Stock Exchange, 1997, Singapore Company Handbook. 
 




Asian Company Handbook 
Datastream  China Credit Information Service, 1997, Business Groups in Taiwan, 
1996-1997, Taipei, Republic of China. 
 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1994, The Money Machine, August 11, 
for the corporate holdings of the Kuomintang. 
Thailand Worldscope 
 
Asian Company Handbook 
 
Securities Exchange of Thailand 
Companies Handbook 1997 
Datastream 
 
Securities Exchange of Thailand 
Companies Handbook 1997 
Tara Siam Ltd., 1997, Thai Business Groups 1996/1997: A Unique 
Guide to Who Owns What, Bangkok, Thailand. 
 
The Nation, 1998, Thai Tycoons: Winners and Losers in the Economic 
Crisis, July, Special Issue. 
 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1997, From Chickens to Microchips: 
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Figure 1:  The Fuyo Group (Japan) 
 
This figure shows the organizational structure of the Fuyo group, the fourth largest keiretsu in Japan. The principal shareholder is 
shown in thick-bordered box. Cash-flow rights are denoted with “C” and voting rights are denoted with “V”. Pyramidal holdings are 
denoted with solid lines. The numbers represent the percentage of cash-flow and voting rights. The difference between ownership and 
control at any given node implies that shares with superior voting rights are used.  No cross-holdings are reported on this figure. 
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Figure 2:  Fuji Bank (Japan) 
 
This figure shows the organizational structure of Fuji Bank, the third largest company in the Fuyo group in terms of market 
capitalization. The principal shareholder chain is shown in the two thick-bordered boxes. Cash-flow rights are denoted with “C” and 
voting rights are denoted with “V”. The numbers represent the percentage of cash-flow and voting rights. Pyramidal holdings are 
denoted with solid lines, cross-holdings are denoted with dotted lines. 
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